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particular, we test the hypothesis that consumption is smoothed to a
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shocks is delayed for a longer period of time. Our analysis is based on
an error-correction framework that allows for asymmetric adjustment.
We find that the mean adjustment lag after a negative shock is 6.5
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consistent with the interpretation that borrowing constraints limit the
degree to which the impact of negative shocks on consumption can be
smoothed.
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By holding internationally diversified portfolios, agents should be able to
pool country-specific risks and thereby reduce the impact of output fluctua-
tions to some extent. The empirical literature on international risk sharing
shows rather convincingly that the degree to which idiosyncratic risk is di-
versified internationally is low (see e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000; Lewis,
1999; Obstfeld, 1994; Backus et al., 1992).1
The sources of this lack of international risk sharing are not yet fully un-
derstood.2 Sørensen and Yosha (1999) find that international risk sharing
among countries occurs to a large extent through international borrowing
and lending. That is, after a country-specific shock, countries adjust their
net asset positions to smooth the impact of the shock. However, this type of
consumption smoothing may be prevented to some extent if countries face
borrowing constraints on international financial markets. In this case it may
not be possible to borrow sufficient amounts to smooth the impact of a neg-
ative shock. Moreover, even if countries are able to borrow, they may not
be able to sustain a negative net foreign asset position for longer periods of
time. In contrast, the impact of positive shocks can be delayed for a longer
period of time via international lending. Thus, if countries face borrow-
ing constraints on the adjustment of their net foreign asset position, then
we expect that consumption responds stronger and also sooner to adverse
shocks. This implies that constraints on international financial markets may
not only lead to a low degree of risk sharing but also to an asymmetric ad-
justment process after disequilibrating output shocks depending on the sign
of these shocks.
1A related branch of the literature studies risk sharing within countries (e.g Asdrubali
et al., 1996; Scorcu, 1998; Buettner, 2002; Borge and Matsen, 2004).
2Several Explanations have been proposed in the literature. See e.g. Backus et al.
(1992), Obstfeld (1994), Lewis (1996), Stockman and Tesar (1995), Baxter and Crucini
(1995), Imbs (2006) and Hoffmann (2008).
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In this paper we focus on this adjustment process back to the long-
run relationship and test the hypothesis that the impact of negative output
shocks on consumption can be smoothed to a lesser degree than the impact
of positive shocks. Although the literature documents and provides explana-
tions for the low degree of international consumption risk sharing it is rather
silent concerning the adjustment process after shocks to output. Thus, we
contribute to the literature in this respect and document a further role of
borrowing constraints besides their relevance for the level of risk sharing.
Our analysis is based on a bivariate error-correction model (ECM) frame-
work, which allows us not only to estimate the degree of international risk
sharing in the long-run but also the speed-of-adjustment back to the long-
run relationship. To study asymmetries we allow the speed-of-adjustment
coefficients to depend on the sign and also the size of disequilibrating shocks.
We find that the mean adjustment lag after a negative output shock is 6.5
years compared to 10.5 years after a positive shock. Hence, the adjustment
of consumption growth to output shocks is indeed asymmetric: countries
can smooth the impact of adverse shocks on consumption for a shorter pe-
riod than the impact of positive shocks. This result is consistent with the
interpretation that borrowing constraints become binding relatively quickly
after negative shocks and thereby reduce a country’s ability to smooth con-
sumption.
The paper is closely related to the literature that investigates the degree
of risk sharing at different time horizons (see e.g. Becker and Hoffmann, 2006;
Artis and Hoffmann, 2004; Canova and Ravn, 1996). These studies typically
argue that the observed lack of international risk sharing may be due to a
lack of insurance against permanent shocks. In contrast to our paper, this
branch of the literature does not explicitly take the adjustment process into
account. Methodologically, our analysis is also related to the literature that
distinguishes between positive and negative changes in output to investigate
3
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the role of borrowing constraints in the context of the permanent output
hypothesis (Shea, 1995a,b; Altonji and Siow, 1987).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines
the empirical methodology which forms the basis of our analysis. Section
3 is devoted to data and estimation results while section 4 summarizes and
concludes the paper.
2 Empirical Model and Methodology
As it is standard in the literature we rely on a measure of risk sharing
based on the benchmark of complete markets. If markets are complete,
then consumption should be (i) highly correlated across countries and (ii)
not be influenced by any idiosyncratic variables, as for instance output (see
Asdrubali et al., 1996; Sørens n and Yosha, 1999). Formally: log cit =
αi+log ct, where cit denotes real per capita consumption at time t in country
i, ct is aggregate consumption, which is defined as a population weighted
average over all relevant countries, and αi are country-specific time-invariant
effects. If country-specific risks are not perfectly pooled across countries,
then consumption will track idiosyncratic or country-specific income, y˜it =
log yit − log yt, where yit is real per capita output in country i and yt is
aggregate output. Thus, we obtain
c˜it = αi + βy˜it, (1)
where c˜it = log c1t − log ct. Note that (1) represents a long-run relationship
and therefore the dynamics of c˜it and y˜it can be expressed in terms of an
ECM.
As noted, if countries face constraints on the adjustment of their foreign
asset holdings, then the adjustment of consumption may be asymmetric
after shocks to output. Specifically, running a negative net foreign asset
position may only be possible in the short run and therefore consumption
4
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is likely to adjust quicker after adverse shocks. In our framework this hy-
pothesis translates into asymmetric error-correction. We interpret periods
of below average output growth as periods when adverse shocks have oc-
curred. Similarly, periods of positive shocks correspond to above average
output growth rates. To model this asymmetry, we introduce two dummy
variables capturing positive, D+it , and negative, D
−
it , deviations from aver-
age output growth. Specifically, these dummies are defined as: D+it = 1 if




i=1∆y˜it is the mean
change in ∆y˜it over the sample period for each country. Similarly, D−it = 1
if ∆y˜it < ∆y˜i. and D−it = 0 otherwise.
Taking the potential asymmetry in the adjustment process into account,
we estimate a bivariate ECM of the following type:
∆c˜it = γ10 + γ11∆y˜it−1 + γ12∆c˜it−1 + λc(c˜it−1 − αi − βy˜it−1) + e1it, (2)
∆y˜it = γ20 + γ21∆c˜it−1 + γ22∆y˜it−1 + λy(c˜it−1 − αi − βy˜it−1) + e2it, (3)






it , for k = c, y, denotes the speed-of-adjustment
coefficients depending on the sign the deviation from average output growth.
Symmetric adjustment occurs if λ−c and λ+c have the same signs and |λ−c | =
|λ+c |. If borrowing constraints limit the degree to which consumption can be
smoothed, then negative output shocks should be mirrored in consumption
sooner than positive shocks and therefore we expect |λ−c | > |λ+c | in this case.
Furthermore, if borrowing constraints limit the amount of consumption
smoothing after negative shocks then it appears conceivable that consump-
tion is particularly exposed to large adverse shocks. That is, constraints may
be particularly tight if countries have to borrow large amounts. To capture
this idea, we introduce an additional set of dummy variables which take the
size of the deviation from average output growth into account: S0it = 1 if
∆y˜i.−σ < ∆y˜it < ∆y˜i.+σ and S0it = 0 otherwise, where ∆y˜i. is the average
change in idiosyncratic output in country i and σ its standard deviation
5
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over the sample period. Similarly, S−it = 1 if ∆y˜it < ∆y˜i. − σ and S−it = 0
otherwise, and S+it = 1 if ∆y˜it > ∆y˜i. + σ and S
+
it = 0 otherwise. Thus,
this set of dummy variables distinguishes between times of roughly average
or normal output growth and episodes of relatively low and high growth,
where we consider values of ∆y˜it which fall within one standard deviation
from the average change as normal.3
Note that our framework is targeted at the analysis of asymmetries in
the adjustment process, but not of the level of risk sharing itself. This is
the case as the dummy variables we introduce are defined with respect to
short-run deviations from average growth. Hence, this classification cannot
be used to separate countries according to the level of risk sharing they
can achieve in the long run. Therefore, we restrict the β coefficient in
(1) to be the same in all countries. This assumption is justified as the
Hausman-test carried out by Leibrecht and Scharler (2008), using the same
data and same specification, does not reject the null hypothesis of a common
long-run degree of international consumption risk sharing. Intuitively, the
homogeneity with respect to β is consistent with the interpretation that in
the long run restrictions that may limit the amount of risk sharing have
rather similar implications across countries.
To empirically implement (2) we follow the methodology outlined in En-
gle and Granger (1987). First, we estimate the long-run relationship in (1),
and second, we estimate (2) and (3) by Seemingly Unrelated Regressions.4
A ‘general-to-specific’- approach is used to derive a parsimonious model. We
thereby apply the sequential general-to-specific testing strategy proposed by
3In principle, we can also identify periods characterized by more extreme deviations by
using e.g. two standard deviations. However, since such periods rarely occur, we would
not have enough observations.
4Our approach requires the series to be cointegrated. Since evidence in favor of coin-
tegration has already been reported in Leibrecht and Scharler (2008) for our data set, we
start directly with the estimation of the ECM.
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Hall (1994) and recommended by Maddala and Kim (1998) to each single
equation and each variable. We start with a lag of T 1/3 (see Said and Dickey,
1984), which implies that the maximum number of lags is 4 in our case, and
test down until the lag is statistically significant at the 10 percent level.5
3 Data and Estimation Results
3.1 Data Description
In our analysis, we include 21 OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the UK and the US. The remaining OECD countries are not
included due to limited data availability. Data are annual and range from
1951 to 2000. All series are obtained from the Penn World Table, release
6.1 by Heston et al. (2002). We use real per capita consumption and real
per capita GDP measured in constant (1996) international prices as prox-
ies for c˜it and y˜it. World aggregates are calculated as weighted averages:
yt =
∑21
i=1 6=j wityit and ct =
∑21
i=1 6=j witcit, with wit = popit/
∑21
i=1 6=j popit,
where popit denotes population. Thus, cit and yit themselves are not in-
cluded in the world aggregate.
Table 1 provides an overview of the deviations from average output
growth in our sample. Columns 2 and 3 of the table show the number of
years characterized by above and below average output growth which corre-
spond to the definitions of D+it and D
−
it . The remaining columns correspond





Not surprisingly, the first two columns show that the numbers of above
and below average growth rates are rather balanced. Moreover, years with
5Note, that we use the same number of observations to compare models with different
lag length. The common number of observations used is 945, which is the number of
observations in case of lag = 4, the maximum lag length we start with.
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above and below average output growth are experienced at the end of our
sample period. Notable exceptions are on the one hand Ireland, Finland
and the United States were the last episodes of below average growth rates
were experienced in earlier years, indicating the relatively favorable macroe-
conomic performance of these countries in the last years. On the other hand
Italy and Japan saw their last above average growth rates in 1995 and 1991,
respectively, which corresponds to the weak performance these two countries
experienced in the second half of the 1990s. From the last three columns
we see that the vast majority of years represent ‘normal’ output growth,
whereas periods where growth is at least one standard deviation above or
below the average occur relatively rarely. Thus, the definitions of S−it and S
+
it
capture rather extreme events. Such extreme events occurred, for instance,
in the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) which expe-
rienced severe economic downturns around 1990. Ireland and Luxembourg,
in contrast, experienced relatively high growth rates in the late 1990s, which
may be due to substantial gains from the European common market.
[Table 1 here ]
3.2 Results
Table 2 shows the estimated parameters of the long-run relationship (1).
We see that y˜it enters strongly significantly with a point estimate of 0.904.
As discussed in Asdrubali et al. (1996) such an estimate implies that only
around 10 percent of idiosyncratic risks are pooled in the long run. Thus,
we find that long-run risk sharing is rather limited, which is in line with the
literature cited above.
[Table 2 here]
Next, we estimate the ECM in (2) - (3). The testing down procedure
8
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shows that relatively parsimonious models are sufficient to capture the short-
run dynamics. The results based on our final specification are reported in
Table 3. The top panel of the table shows the estimation results for the con-
sumption equation (2). First of all, we see that ∆c˜it responds significantly
to ∆y˜it−1 which is inconsistent with perfect risk sharing since any influence
of idiosyncratic variables - even lagged - should be completely eliminated
under perfect risk sharing.
What we are primarily interest in are the speed-of-adjustment coefficients
in the consumption equation. From Table 3 we see that the point estimates
for λ+c and λ
−
c are both significantly negative which shows that consumption
growth reacts to deviations from the long-run relationship in times of below
and also above average output growth. Comparing the magnitudes of the es-
timated speed-of-adjustment coefficients shows that c˜it reacts more strongly
to deviations from the long-run relationship when output growth is below
average output growth. In this case, the estimated speed-of-adjustment co-
efficient is -0.150. In the case that ∆y˜it > ∆y˜i., we estimate the speed of
adjustment coefficient to be −0.094. Furthermore, the null hypothesis of
equal speed-of-adjustment coefficients for positive and negative deviations
is rejected at the 10 percent level. The estimates imply mean adjustment
lags of about 6.5 and 10.5 years.6
Thus, the ordering of the estimated speed-of-adjustment coefficients is
consistent with our hypothesis that borrowing constraints become binding
soon after negative shocks.7 Intuitively, when countries experience adverse
6The mean adjustment lags are calculated as 1/
∣∣λ+c ∣∣ and 1/∣∣λ−c ∣∣, respectively.
7Note that symmetric adjustment is not necessarily inconsistent with the existence of
borrowing constraints. Consider a country that experiences a positive shock. To smooth
the impact of the shock, this country can lend to other countries. However, if all or most
other countries face credit constraints, then this may not be possible. Hence, the response
to the positive shock would be similar to the response to a negative shock. Thus, symmetric
adjustment also indicate that almost all countries in the sample face constraints. However,
given our results, this case does not appear to be relevant empirically.
9
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shocks to their idiosyncratic output growth rates, then their consumption
growth mirrors output growth closely already after a relatively short period
of time. The lower panel of Table 3 shows the results for the output equation
(3). We see that three of its own lags are sufficient to capture the short run
dynamics of idiosyncratic output growth ∆y˜it. The table also shows that
the response of ∆y˜it is only significantly different from zero in the case of
positive deviations. Nevertheless the null that λ−y = λ+y = 0 is rejected
at the 10 percent level. Hence, ∆y˜it cannot be considered to be weakly
exogenous in our system. Thus, consumption as well as output respond to
shocks to restore the long-run relationship. Note that direct convergence to
the long-run relationship occurs if λc is negative and λy is positive. We find,
however, that λ+y turns out to be significantly below zero. Nevertheless, the
system is stable since |λc| > |λy| (see Juselius, 2006). The absolute value
of the sum of the speed-of-adjustment coefficients is by far larger in the
consumption equation.
[Table 3 here]
Next, we characterize risk sharing not only according to the sign of the
deviation from average output growth, but also according to the the size of
the deviation. We re-estimate the ECM in (2) - (3) but now we parameterize










it , for k = c, y.
Table 4 shows that we obtain the lowest speed-of-adjustment coefficient
in the consumption equation of −0.216 for the case where output growth
is at least one standard deviation below average output growth. For values
of ∆y˜it which are close to the average ∆y˜i. we obtain a markedly higher
speed-of-adjustment coefficient of −0.111 and therefore a slower adjustment
of consumption growth. The slowest adjustment is implied by the estimate
for λ+c of −0.097 which is associated with output growth rates which are
at least one standard deviation above average output growth. Most im-
10
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portantly however, λ−c is significantly different from both, λ+c and λ0c . The
implied mean adjustment lags are about 4.5, 9 and 10 years respectively.
Experiencing a pronounced negative output shock results in a much faster
return to the long-run equilibrium than experiencing a negative, yet ‘nor-
mal’, or a positive deviation from average growth. Thus, the ordering of
the estimated speed-of-adjustment coefficients is again consistent with our
hypothesis. Note also that our results imply that consumption growth re-
sponds rather similarly after marked positive shocks and in normal periods
from both a substantive and a statistical viewpoint.
Turning to the results for the output equation in the lower panel of
the table, we again see that ∆y˜it reacts significantly only in the case of
positive deviations. As before, the null of joint insignificance of the speed-
of-adjustment coefficients in (3) is rejected and the system is stable.
[Table 4 here]
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we analyze whether the adjustment process of consumption
growth after disequilibrating output shocks depends on the sign of the shock.
We indeed find evidence in this respect. The long-run equilibrium is re-
stored relatively quickly after adverse output shocks, whereas consumption
growth adjusts slower after positive output shocks. Thus, countries are
able to smooth the impact of adverse shocks only to a comparably limited
extent. One explanation is that borrowing constraints on international fi-
nancial markets reduce the opportunities to smooth adverse output effects.
It has to be pointed out that borrowing constraints are perhaps not the
only source of asymmetric adjustment in consumption. However, since it is
well documented in the literature that risk sharing occurs primarily via the
11
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adjustment of asset holdings, frictions on international credit markets that
result in borrowing constraints are likely to play a non-negligible role.
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Table 1: Deviations from average output growth
below above positive negative normal
Australia 22 (2000) 27 (1999) 3 (1958) 9 (1990) 37
Austria 28 (2000) 21 (1998) 7 (1974) 4 (1984) 38
Belgium 24 (1998) 25 (2000) 6 (1991) 8 (1993) 35
Canada 19 (1996) 30 (2000) 4 (1999) 11 (1991) 34
Switzerland 28 (1999) 21 (2000) 8 (1989) 4 (1976) 37
Denmark 29 (1999) 20 (2000) 11 (1994) 5 (1989) 33
Spain 23 (2000) 26 (1999) 4 (1995) 6 (1996) 39
Finland 23 (1993) 26 (2000) 7 (1982) 7 (1992) 35
France 28 (2000) 21 (1998) 9 (1982) 4 (1993) 36
United Kingdom 26 (1999) 23 (2000) 8 (1994) 5 (1981) 36
Greece 27 (1999) 22 (2000) 12 (1975) 7 (1987) 30
Ireland 23 (1986) 26 (2000) 8 (2000) 10 (1986) 31
Italy 24 (2000) 25 (1995) 8 (1980) 10 (2000) 31
Japan 25 (2000) 24 (1991) 9 (1970) 6 (1999) 34
Luxembourg 26 (1996) 23 (2000) 9 (1997) 5 (1975) 35
Netherlands 24 (2000) 25 (1999) 5 (1991) 6 (1981) 38
Norway 23 (2000) 26 (1997) 4 (1993) 10 (1999) 35
New Zealand 23 (1998) 26 (2000) 6 (1991) 5 (1977) 38
Portugal 24 (2000) 25 (1999) 6 (1991) 7 (1994) 36
Sweden 24 (1997) 25 (2000) 7 (1982) 8 (1993) 34
United States 23 (1991) 26 (2000) 2 (1984) 10 (1981) 37
Notes: The columns labeled ‘below’ and ‘above’ report the number of periods in which real
per capita GDP growth was either below or above the average growth rate. In brackets
we report the last year when a positive or negative deviation occurred. The columns
labeled ‘positive’, “negative” and “normal” report the number of years in which real per
capita GDP growth was at least one standard deviation blow average growth, at least one
standard deviation above average growth and within plus/minus one standard deviation
of the average growth rate, respectively. In brackets, we report the last year when the
respective deviation occurred.
Table 2: Long-run Relationship
coef sd p-value
const 0.118 0.012 0.000




Notes: Country dummies are jointly significant and therefore included in the estimation.
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Table 3: Asymmetric Error-Correction
Dep. Var.: ∆c˜it coef sd p-value
const -0.005 0.005 0.327
∆y˜it−1 0.104 0.041 0.011
λ+c -0.094 0.023 0.000
λ−c -0.150 0.023 0.000
obs 966
H0 : λ+c = λ
−
c 0.089
Dep. Var.: ∆y˜it coef sd p-value
const -0.005 0.004 0.168
∆y˜it−1 0.190 0.030 0.000
∆y˜it−2 -0.012 0.027 0.643
∆y˜it−3 0.058 0.026 0.024
λ+y -0.036 0.017 0.035
λ−y -0.009 0.017 0.577
obs 966
H0 : λ+y = λ
−
y = 0 0.091
Notes: The top panel of the table reports estimated coefficient for the error correction
model with ∆c˜it as the dependent variable. The bottom panel reports the results for ∆y˜it
as the dependent variable. Country dummies are jointly significant and therefore included
in the estimation.
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Table 4: Asymmetric Error-Correction and Large Deviations
Dep. Var.: ∆c˜it coef sd p-value
const -0.005 0.005 0.348
∆y˜it−1 0.100 0.042 0.016
λ0c -0.111 0.019 0.000
λ+c -0.097 0.044 0.028
λ−c -0.216 0.046 0.000
obs 966
H0 : λ+c = λ
−
c 0.062
H0 : λ0c = λ
−
c 0.034
Dep.Var: ∆y˜it coef sd p-value
const -0.005 0.004 0.164
∆y˜it−1 0.185 0.031 0.000
∆y˜it−2 -0.011 0.026 0.678
∆y˜it−3 0.058 0.026 0.024
λ0y -0.019 0.014 0.177
λ+y -0.072 0.033 0.027
λ−y 0.008 0.033 0.822
obs 966




y = 0 0.078
Notes: The top panel of the table reports estimated coefficient for the error correction
model with ∆c˜it as the dependent variable. The bottom panel reports the results for ∆y˜it
as the dependent variable. Country dummies are jointly significant and therefore included
in the estimation.
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Borrowing Constraints and International Risk




We analyze the adjustment process of consumption growth after
disequilibrating output shocks in a sample of OECD countries. In par-
ticular, we test the hypothesis that consumption is smoothed to a lesser
degree after negative shocks, whereas the impact of a positive shock is
delayed for a longer period of time. Our analysis is based on an error-
correction framework that allows for asymmetric adjustment. We find
that the mean adjustment lag after a negative shock is significantly
shorter than after a positive shock, especially since the beginning of
the 1980s. This result is consistent with the interpretation that bor-
rowing constraints limit the degree to which the impact of negative
shocks on consumption can be smoothed.
Keywords: International Risk Sharing, Error-Correction
JEL codes: F36, F41
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By holding internationally diversified portfolios, agents should be able to
pool country-specific risks and thereby reduce the impact of output fluctua-
tions to some extent. The empirical literature on international risk sharing
shows rather convincingly that the degree to which idiosyncratic risk is di-
versified internationally is low (see e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000; Lewis,
1999; Obstfeld, 1994; Backus et al., 1992).1
The sources of this lack of international risk sharing are not yet fully un-
derstood.2 Sørensen and Yosha (1999) find that international risk sharing
among countries occurs to a large extent through international borrowing
and lending. That is, after a country-specific shock, countries adjust their
net asset positions to smooth the impact of the shock. However, this type of
consumption smoothing may be prevented to some extent if countries face
borrowing constraints on international financial markets. In this case it may
not be possible to borrow sufficient amounts to smooth the impact of a neg-
ative shock. Moreover, even if countries are able to borrow, they may not
be able to sustain a negative net foreign asset position for longer periods of
time. In contrast, the impact of positive shocks can be delayed for a longer
period of time via international lending. Thus, if countries face borrow-
ing constraints on the adjustment of their net foreign asset position, then
we expect that consumption responds stronger and also sooner to adverse
shocks. This implies that constraints on international financial markets may
not only lead to a low degree of risk sharing but also to an asymmetric ad-
justment process after disequilibrating output shocks depending on the sign
of these shocks.
In this paper we focus on this adjustment process back to the long-
1A related branch of the literature studies risk sharing within countries (e.g Asdrubali
et al., 1996; Scorcu, 1998; Buettner, 2002; Borge and Matsen, 2004).
2Several Explanations have been proposed in the literature. See e.g. Backus et al.
(1992), Obstfeld (1994), Lewis (1996), Stockman and Tesar (1995), Baxter and Crucini
(1995), Imbs (2006) and Hoffmann (2008).
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run relationship and test the hypothesis that the impact of negative output
shocks on consumption can be smoothed to a lesser degree than the impact
of positive shocks. Although the literature documents and provides explana-
tions for the low degree of international consumption risk sharing it is rather
silent concerning the adjustment process after shocks to output. Thus, we
contribute to the literature in this respect and document a further role of
borrowing constraints besides their relevance for the level of risk sharing.
Our analysis is based on a bivariate error-correction model (ECM) frame-
work, which allows us to estimate not only the degree of international risk
sharing in the long- un but also the speed-of-adjustment back to the long-
run relationship. To study asymmetries we allow the speed-of-adjustment
coefficients to depend on the sign and also the size of disequilibrating shocks.
We find that the adjustment occurs significantly faster in case of negative
shocks. Hence, the adjustment of consumption growth to output shocks is
indeed asymmetric: countries can smooth the impact of adverse shocks on
consumption for a shorter period of time than the impact of positive shocks.
This result is consistent with the interpretation that borrowing constraints
become binding relatively quickly after negative shocks and thereby reduce
a country’s ability to smooth consumption.
The paper is closely related to the literature that investigates the degree
of risk sharing at different time horizons (see e.g. Becker and Hoffmann, 2006;
Artis and Hoffmann, 2008; Canova and Ravn, 1996). These studies typically
argue that the observed lack of international risk sharing may be due to a
lack of insurance against permanent shocks. In contrast to our paper, this
branch of the literature does not explicitly take the adjustment process into
account. Methodologically, our analysis is also related to the literature that
distinguishes between positive and negative changes in output to investigate
the role of borrowing constraints in the context of the permanent income
hypothesis (Shea, 1995a,b; Altonji and Siow, 1987).
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines
the empirical methodology which forms the basis of our analysis. Section
3 is devoted to data and estimation results while section 4 summarizes and
concludes the paper.
2 Empirical Model and Methodology
As it is standard in the literature we rely on a measure of risk sharing
based on the benchmark of complete markets. If markets are complete,
then consumption should be (i) highly correlated across countries and (ii)
not be influenced by any idiosyncratic variables, as for instance output (see
Asdrubali et al., 1996; Sørensen and Yosha, 1999).
Formally, assuming constant relative risk aversion utility functions, an
efficient allocation is characterized by: log cit = αi+log ct, where cit denotes
real per capita consumption at time t in country i, ct is aggregate consump-
tion, which is defined as a population weighted average over all relevant coun-
tries, and αi are country-specific time-invariant effects. If country-specific
risks are not perfectly pooled across countries, then consumption will track
idiosyncratic or country-specific income, y˜it = log yit − log yt, where yit is
real per capita output in country i and yt is aggregate output. Thus, we
obtain
c˜it = αi + βy˜it, (1)
where c˜it = log c1t − log ct. Note that (1) represents a long-run relationship
and therefore the dynamics of c˜it and y˜it can be expressed in terms of an
ECM.
As briefly mentioned above, our analysis is based on the idea that con-
straints on the adjustment of foreign asset holdings give rise to asymmetric
adjustment processes. Specifically, running a negative net foreign asset po-
sition may only be possible over a rather short period of time. Therefore
consumption is likely to adjust quicker after adverse shocks. Thus, if risk
4
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sharing is indeed limited by binding borrowing constraints, then we expect
to observe that consumption reacts faster to negative movements in output.
Note that although an asymmetric adjustment indicates that countries
face borrowing constraints, a symmetric adjustment does not imply that
borrowing constraints are absent or not binding. Consider the extreme case
of autarky, where countries have no access to international financial mar-
kets and are therefore confined to consume their outputs in every period.
By definition, this situation corresponds to a complete lack of international
risk sharing and consumption perfectly tracks income in each country. It
follows that the adjustment of consumption is necessarily symmetric, re-
gardless of the sign of any shocks that lead to movements in output. Thus,
although countries face extremely severe constraints in the sense that they
are completely unable to participate on international financial markets, the
adjustment process is still symmetric.
Even if we consider less extreme situations, symmetric adjustment may
still be consistent with the existence of borrowing constraints. Consider
a country that experiences a positive shock. To smooth the impact of the
shock, this country can lend to other countries. However, if all or most other
countries face credit constraints, then this may not be possible. Hence,
the response to the positive shock would be similar to the response to a
negative shock. Thus, symmetric adjustment may also indicate that almost
all countries in the sample face constraints.
In short, although an asymmetric adjustment is consistent with the inter-
pretation that countries face borrowing constraints on international financial
markets, a symmetric adjustment process does not allow for an unambiguous
interpretation.
In our estimation framework, asymmetric adjustment due to constraints
translates into asymmetric error-correction. We interpret periods of below
average output growth as periods when adverse shocks have occurred. Sim-
5
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ilarly, periods of positive shocks correspond to above average output growth
rates. To model this asymmetry, we introduce two dummy variables captur-
ing positive, D+it , and negative, D
−
it , deviations from average output growth.
Specifically, these dummies are defined as: D+it = 1 if ∆y˜it > ∆y˜i. and




i=1∆y˜it is the mean change in ∆y˜it
over the sample period for each country. Similarly, D−it = 1 if ∆y˜it < ∆y˜i.
and D−it = 0 otherwise.
Taking the potential asymmetry in the adjustment process into account,
we estimate a bivariate ECM of the following type:
∆c˜it = γ10 + γ11∆y˜it−1 + γ12∆c˜it−1 + λc(c˜it−1 − αi − βy˜it−1) + e1it, (2)
∆y˜it = γ20 + γ21∆c˜it−1 + γ22∆y˜it−1 + λy(c˜it−1 − αi − βy˜it−1) + e2it, (3)






it , for k = c, y, denotes the speed-of-adjustment
coefficients depending on the sign the deviation from average output growth.
Symmetric adjustment occurs if λ−c and λ+c have the same signs and |λ−c | =
|λ+c |. If borrowing constraints limit the degree to which consumption can be
smoothed, then negative output shocks should be mirrored in consumption
sooner than positive shocks and therefore we expect |λ−c | > |λ+c | in this case.
Furthermore, if borrowing constraints limit the amount of consumption
smoothing after negative shocks then it appears conceivable that consump-
tion is particularly exposed to large adverse shocks. That is, constraints may
be particularly tight if countries have to borrow large amounts. To capture
this idea, we introduce an additional set of dummy variables which take the
size of the deviation from average output growth into account: S0it = 1 if
∆y˜i.−σ < ∆y˜it < ∆y˜i.+σ and S0it = 0 otherwise, where ∆y˜i. is the average
change in idiosyncratic output in country i and σ its standard deviation
over the sample period. Similarly, S−it = 1 if ∆y˜it < ∆y˜i. − σ and S−it = 0
otherwise, and S+it = 1 if ∆y˜it > ∆y˜i. + σ and S
+
it = 0 otherwise. Thus,
this set of dummy variables distinguishes between times of roughly average
6
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or normal output growth and episodes of relatively low and high growth,
where we consider values of ∆y˜it which fall within one standard deviation
around the average change as normal.3
Note that the dummy variables we introduce are defined with respect to
short-run deviations from average growth. Hence, this classification cannot
be used to separate countries according to the level of risk sharing they
can achieve in the long run. Therefore, we restrict the β coefficient in
(1) to be the same in all countries. This assumption is justified as the
Hausman-test carried out by Leibrecht and Scharler (2008), using the same
data and same specification, does not reject the null hypothesis of a common
long-run degree of international consumption risk sharing. Intuitively, the
homogeneity with respect to β implies that in the long run any restrictions
that limit the amount of risk sharing have rather similar implications across
countries.
To empirically implement (2) we follow the methodology outlined in En-
gle and Granger (1987). First, we estimate the long-run relationship in (1),
and second, we estimate (2) and (3) by Seemingly Unrelated Regressions.4
A ‘general-to-specific’- approach is used to derive a parsimonious model. We
thereby apply the sequential general-to-specific testing strategy proposed by
Hall (1994) and recommended by Maddala and Kim (1998) to each single
equation and each variable. We start with a lag of T 1/3 (see Said and Dickey,
1984) and test down until the lag is statistically significant at the 10 percent
significance level.
3In principle, we can also identify periods characterized by more extreme deviations by
using e.g. two standard deviations. However, since such periods rarely occur, we would
not have enough observations for statistically identifying the effect.
4Our approach requires the series to be cointegrated. Since evidence in favor of coin-
tegration has already been reported in Leibrecht and Scharler (2008) for our data set, we
start directly with the estimation of the ECM.
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3 Data and Estimation Results
3.1 Data Description
In our analysis, we include 21 OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the UK and the US. The remaining OECD countries are not
included due to limited data availability. Data are annual and range from
1951 to 2000. All series are obtained from the Penn World Table, release
6.1 by Heston et al. (2002). We use real per capita consumption and real
per capita GDP measured in constant (1996) international prices as prox-
ies for c˜it and y˜it. World aggregates are calculated as weighted averages:
yt =
∑21
i=1 6=j wityit and ct =
∑21
i=1 6=j witcit, with wit = popit/
∑21
i=1 6=j popit,
where popit denotes population. Thus, cit and yit themselves are not in-
cluded in the world aggregate.
Table 1 provides an overview of the deviations from average output
growth in our sample. Columns 2 and 3 of the table show the number of
years characterized by above and below average output growth which corre-
spond to the definitions of D+it and D
−
it . The remaining columns correspond





Not surprisingly, the first two columns show that the numbers of above
and below average growth rates are rather balanced. Moreover, years with
above and below average output growth are experienced at the end of our
sample period. Notable exceptions are Ireland, Finland and the United
States were the last episodes of below average growth rates were experienced
in earlier years, indicating the relatively favorable macroeconomic perfor-
mance of these countries in the last years. Italy and Japan, in contrast,
saw their last above average growth rates in 1995 and 1991, respectively,
which corresponds to the weak performance these two countries experienced
in the second half of the 1990s. From the last three columns we see that the
8
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vast majority of years represent periods of ‘normal’ output growth, whereas
periods where growth is at least one standard deviation above or below the
average occur relatively rarely. Thus, the definitions of S−it and S
+
it capture
rather extreme events. Such extreme events occurred, for instance, in the
Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) which experienced
severe economic downturns around 1990. Ireland and Luxembourg, in con-
trast, experienced relatively high growth rates in the late 1990s, which may
be due to substantial gains from the European common market.
[Table 1 here ]
3.2 Results
Table 2 shows the estimated parameters of the long-run relationship (1).
Estimates are based on the country fixed effects estimator (FE) as well as on
the fully-modified OLS (FMOLS) estimator of Pedroni (2000) which allows
us to conduct valid inference. We see that y˜it enters strongly significantly
with a point estimate of about 0.900. As discussed in Asdrubali et al. (1996)
such an estimate implies that only around 10 percent of idiosyncratic risks
are pooled in the long run. Thus, we find that long-run risk sharing is rather
limited, which is in line with the literature cited above.
[Table 2 here]
Next, we estimate the ECM in (2) - (3). The testing down procedure
shows that relatively parsimonious models are sufficient to capture the short-
run dynamics. The results based on our final specification are reported in
Table 3. The top panel of the table shows the estimation results for the con-
sumption equation (2). First of all, we see that ∆c˜it responds significantly
to ∆y˜it−1 which is inconsistent with perfect risk sharing since any influence
of idiosyncratic variables - even lagged - should be completely eliminated
under perfect risk sharing.
9
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What we are primarily interest in are the speed-of-adjustment coeffi-
cients in the consumption equation. From Table 3 we see that the point
estimates for λ+c and λ
−
c are both significantly negative which shows that
consumption growth reacts to deviations from the long-run relationship in
times of below and also above average output growth. Comparing the mag-
nitudes of the estimated speed-of-adjustment coefficients shows that c˜it re-
acts more strongly to deviations from the long-run relationship when output
growth is below average output growth. In this case, the estimated speed-
of-adjustment coefficient is -0.150. In the case that ∆y˜it > ∆y˜i., we estimate
the speed-of-adjustment coefficient to be −0.094. The null hypothesis that
the speed-of-adjustment coefficients are equal is marginally rejected at the 10
percent significance level. The estimated coefficients of −0.094 and −0.150
translate into mean adjustment lags of 10.5 and 6.5 years in case of negative
and positive income shocks.5 Thus, these results provide first evidence in
favor of our hypothesis that borrowing constraints become binding soon af-
ter negative income shocks. Intuitively, when countries experience adverse
shocks to their idiosyncratic output growth rates, then their consumption
growth mirrors output growth closely already after a relatively short period
of time.
The lower panel of Table 3 shows the results for the output equation
(3). We see that three of its own lags are sufficient to capture the short
run dynamics of idiosyncratic output growth ∆y˜it. The table also shows
that the response of ∆y˜it is only significantly different from zero in the case
of positive deviations. Nevertheless the null that λ−y = λ+y = 0 is rejected
at the 10 percent level. Hence, ∆y˜it cannot be considered to be weakly
exogenous in our system. Thus, consumption as well as output respond to
shocks to restore the long-run relationship. Note that direct convergence to
the long-run relationship occurs if λc is negative and λy is positive. We find,
5The mean adjustment lags are calculated as 1/
∣∣λ+c ∣∣ and 1/∣∣λ−c ∣∣, respectively.
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however, that λ+y turns out to be significantly below zero. Nevertheless, the
system is stable since |λc| > |λy| (see Juselius, 2006).
[Table 3 here]
Next, we characterize risk sharing not only according to the sign of the
deviation from average output growth, but also according to the size of the
deviation. We re-estimate the ECM in (2) - (3) but now we parameterize










it , for k = c, y.
Table 4 shows that we obtain the lowest speed-of-adjustment coefficient
in the consumption equation of −0.216 for the case where output growth
is at least one standard deviation below average output growth. For values
of ∆y˜it which are close to the average ∆y˜i. we obtain a markedly higher
speed-of-adjustment coefficient of −0.111 and therefore a slower adjustment
of consumption growth. A similar speed-of-adjustment is implied by the
estimate for λ+c of −0.097 which is associated with output growth rates that
are at least one standard deviation above average output growth. Most
importantly however, λ−c is significantly different from both, λ0c and λ+c at
the 5 and 10 percent significance level. The implied mean adjustment lags
are about 4, 9 and 10 years respectively. Experiencing a pronounced negative
output shock results in a much faster return to the long-run equilibrium than
experiencing a negative, yet ‘normal’, or a positive deviation from average
growth. Thus, the ordering of the estimated speed-of-adjustment coefficients
is again consistent with our hypothesis. Note also that our results imply that
consumption growth responds rather similarly after marked positive shocks
and in normal periods.
Turning to the results for the output equation in the lower panel of
the table, we again see that ∆y˜it reacts significantly only in the case of
positive deviations. As before, the null of joint insignificance of the speed-
of-adjustment coefficients in (3) is rejected and the system is stable.
11
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3.3 Financial Globalization and the Adjustment Process
Over the last decades, international financial markets have become increas-
ingly liberalized and integrated. Several papers show that financial integra-
tion increases the international sharing of consumption risk (see e.g. Imbs,
2006; Sørensen et al., 2005). Therefore, in this section, we study how the ad-
justment after shocks has changed over time along with the ongoing process
of the globalization of financial markets. More specifically, we split our sam-
ple in 1980 and re-estimate the long-run relationship (1) as well as the ECM
in (2) and (3) for the two resulting subsamples. The choice of the date at
which we split the sample is motivated by Artis and Hoffmann (2008) who
argue that since the beginning of the 1980s, the higher integration of inter-
national financial markets has resulted in higher international risk sharing.
We first test for cointegration between c˜it and y˜it in the two subsamples
using the panel cointegration test of Pedroni (1999). Table 5 shows that the
vast majority of the tests reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration for
both time periods. Thus, we may conclude that c˜it and y˜it are cointegrated
in both subsamples.
[Table 5 here]
Table 6 shows the coefficients for the long-run relationship in (1) es-
timated over the two subsamples. As expected, the long-run exposure of
consumption growth to idiosyncratic output growth has declined. Thus, we
find that long-run risk sharing improved, although the extent of risk sharing
still remains low. Overall, these findings are in line with Artis and Hoffmann
(2008), who also document an increase in risk sharing over time.
[Table 6 here]
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Table 7 shows the results for equation (2) with ∆c˜it as the dependent
variable.6 We include two lags of the consumption growth rate in both sub-
samples, whereas lagged values of the output growth rate are only included
in the first subsample. In the later subsample, lagged values of consumption
growth are sufficient to capture the short-term dynamics as indicated by our
testing down strategy.
Turning to the speed-of-adjustment coefficients we see that λ+ and λ−
are significantly different from zero in both subsamples. Note that in the
period 1950 - 1979 the null of an equal speed-of-adjustment, λ+ = λ− cannot
be rejected. Recall, however, from the discussion in Section 2 that a sym-
metric adjustment process does not allow for an unambiguous interpretation
in terms of the relevance of borrowing constraints. The symmetric adjust-
ment during the first subsample may simply indicate that most countries in
our sample faced severe constraints. This interpretation is also consistent
with the negligible extent of long-run of risk sharing we find for the period
prior to 1980.
[Table 7 here]
After 1980, however, we find evidence in favor of an asymmetric adjust-
ment. Table 7 shows that the null hypothesis of equal speed-of-adjustment
coefficients is rejected at the 5 percent significance level. Hence, consump-
tion adjusts significantly faster after negative shocks which indicates that
borrowing constraints are relevant and do not allow to postpone the impact
of adverse shocks for longer periods of time. Our estimates imply a mean
adjustment lag of 5 years if output growth is above average, whereas the
mean adjustment lag is only 3 years when output growth is below aver-
6Note that we only report the estimation results for the case where the speed-of-
adjustment coefficient depends on the sign of the deviation of idiosyncratic output growth
from its average but not on the size of the deviation. Taking the size of the deviation
into account leaves our conclusions qualitatively unaffected. Also note that the system is
stable in both time periods. However, to preserve space we do not report the results for
(3) estimated over the subsamples. Detailed estimation results are available upon request.
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age. Thus, the asymmetric speed-of-adjust is in line with the interpretation
that the low degree of risk sharing may be due to borrowing constraints on
international financial markets.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we analyze whether the adjustment process of consumption
growth after disequilibrating output shocks depends on the sign of the shock.
We indeed find evidence in this respect, especially since 1980. The long-
run equilibrium is restored relatively quickly after adverse output shocks,
whereas consumption growth adjusts slower after positive output shocks.
Thus, countries are able to smooth the impact of adverse shocks only to a
comparably limited extent. One explanation is that borrowing constraints
on international financial markets reduce the opportunities to smooth ad-
verse output effects.
It has to be pointed out that borrowing constraints are perhaps not the
only source of asymmetric adjustment in consumption. However, since it is
well documented in the literature that risk sharing occurs primarily via the
adjustment of asset holdings, frictions on international credit markets that
result in borrowing constraints are likely to play a non-negligible role.
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Table 1: Deviations from average output growth
below above positive negative normal
Australia 22 (2000) 27 (1999) 3 (1958) 9 (1990) 37
Austria 28 (2000) 21 (1998) 7 (1974) 4 (1984) 38
Belgium 24 (1998) 25 (2000) 6 (1991) 8 (1993) 35
Canada 19 (1996) 30 (2000) 4 (1999) 11 (1991) 34
Switzerland 28 (1999) 21 (2000) 8 (1989) 4 (1976) 37
Denmark 29 (1999) 20 (2000) 11 (1994) 5 (1989) 33
Spain 23 (2000) 26 (1999) 4 (1995) 6 (1996) 39
Finland 23 (1993) 26 (2000) 7 (1982) 7 (1992) 35
France 28 (2000) 21 (1998) 9 (1982) 4 (1993) 36
United Kingdom 26 (1999) 23 (2000) 8 (1994) 5 (1981) 36
Greece 27 (1999) 22 (2000) 12 (1975) 7 (1987) 30
Ireland 23 (1986) 26 (2000) 8 (2000) 10 (1986) 31
Italy 24 (2000) 25 (1995) 8 (1980) 10 (2000) 31
Japan 25 (2000) 24 (1991) 9 (1970) 6 (1999) 34
Luxembourg 26 (1996) 23 (2000) 9 (1997) 5 (1975) 35
Netherlands 24 (2000) 25 (1999) 5 (1991) 6 (1981) 38
Norway 23 (2000) 26 (1997) 4 (1993) 10 (1999) 35
New Zealand 23 (1998) 26 (2000) 6 (1991) 5 (1977) 38
Portugal 24 (2000) 25 (1999) 6 (1991) 7 (1994) 36
Sweden 24 (1997) 25 (2000) 7 (1982) 8 (1993) 34
United States 23 (1991) 26 (2000) 2 (1984) 10 (1981) 37
Notes: The columns labeled ‘below’ and ‘above’ report the number of periods in which real
per capita GDP growth was either below or above the average growth rate. In brackets
we report the last year when a positive or negative deviation occurred. The columns
labeled ‘positive’, “negative” and “normal” report the number of years in which real per
capita GDP growth was at least one standard deviation blow average growth, at least one
standard deviation above average growth and within plus/minus one standard deviation
of the average growth rate, respectively. In brackets, we report the last year when the
respective deviation occurred.
Table 2: Long-run Relationship
Dep. Var.: c˜it coef sd p-value
FE 0.904 n.a. n.a.
FMOLS 0.900 0.02 0.000
obs 1050
Notes: The table shows the estimated coefficient of y˜it in the long-run relationship, based
on the country fixed effects estimator (FE) and the fully-modified OLS (FMOLS) estima-
tor. Common time effects are subtracted (results with common time effects not subtracted
are qualitatively similar).
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Table 3: Asymmetric Error-Correction
Dep. Var.: ∆c˜it coef sd p-value
∆y˜it−1 0.104 0.041 0.011
λ+c -0.094 0.023 0.000
λ−c -0.150 0.023 0.000
obs 966
H0 : λ+c = λ
−
c 0.089
Dep. Var.: ∆y˜it coef sd p-value
∆y˜it−1 0.190 0.030 0.000
∆y˜it−2 -0.012 0.027 0.643
∆y˜it−3 0.058 0.006 0.024
λ+y -0.036 0.017 0.035
λ−y -0.009 0.017 0.577
obs 966
H0 : λ+y = λ
−
y = 0 0.091
Notes: The top panel of the table reports estimated coefficients for the error correction
model with ∆c˜it as the dependent variable. The bottom panel reports the results for ∆y˜it
as the dependent variable. Country dummies are jointly significant and therefore included
in the estimation.
Table 4: Asymmetric Error-Correction and Large Deviations
Dep. Var.: ∆c˜it coef sd p-value
∆y˜it−1 0.100 0.042 0.016
λ0c -0.111 0.019 0.000
λ+c -0.097 0.044 0.028
λ−c -0.216 0.046 0.000
obs 966
H0 : λ+c = λ
−
c 0.062
H0 : λ0c = λ
−
c 0.034
Dep.Var: ∆y˜it coef sd p-value
∆y˜it−1 0.185 0.031 0.000
∆y˜it−2 -0.011 0.026 0.678
∆y˜it−3 0.058 0.026 0.024
λ0y -0.019 0.014 0.177
λ+y -0.072 0.033 0.027
λ−y 0.008 0.033 0.822
obs 966




y = 0 0.078
Notes: The top panel of the table reports estimated coefficients for the error correction
model with ∆c˜it as the dependent variable. The bottom panel reports the results for ∆y˜it
as the dependent variable. Country dummies are jointly significant and therefore included
in the estimation.
19
Page 36 of 38








































































Notes: Based on one-sided, unweighed tests with common time effects sub-
tracted (tests with common time effects not subtracted show similar results).
All test statistics follow asymptotically standard normal distribution under
the null of unit root or no cointegration ∗∗∗(∗∗)[∗] stands for 1% (5%) [10%].
Table 6: Long-Run Risk Sharing before and after 1980
1950 - 1979 1980 - 2000
Dep. Var.: c˜it coef sd p-value coef sd p-value
FE 0.850 n.a n.a 0.690 n.a n.a.
FMOLS 0.940 0.016 0.000 0.780 0.041 0.000
obs 609 441
Notes: The table shows the estimated coefficient of y˜it in the long-run relationship, based
on the country fixed effects estimator (FE) and the fully-modified OLS (FMOLS) estima-
tor. Common time effects are subtracted (results with common time effects not subtracted
are qualitatively similar).
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